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Abstract
Several studies have shown that communicative language production as compared to non-
communicative language production recruits parts of the mentalizing or theory of mind net-
work, yet the exact role of this network in communication remains underspecified. In this
study, we therefore aimed to test under what conditions the mentalizing network contributes
to communicative language production. We were especially interested in distinguishing
between situations in which speakers have to consider which information they do or do not
share with their addressee (common vs. privileged ground information). We therefore
manipulated whether speakers had to distinguish between common and privileged ground
in order to communicate efficiently with the listener, in addition to comparing language pro-
duction in a communicative and a non-communicative context. Participants performed a ref-
erential communicative game in the MRI-scanner as well as a similar, non-communicative
task. We found that the medial prefrontal cortex, a core region of the mentalizing network, is
especially sensitive to communicative contexts in which speakers have to take their
addressee’s needs into account in order to communicate efficiently. In addition, we found
neural differences between the communicative and the non-communicative settings before
speakers started to plan their utterances, suggesting that they continuously update common
ground in a communicative context.
Introduction
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the study of the neural mechanisms supporting
the social and communicative aspects of language production. A number of studies have
shown that planning a communicative action as compared to a non-communicative action
recruits parts of the mentalizing or theory of mind network, suggesting that people mentalize
about their interlocutor’s intentions and beliefs when planning a communicative action. For
example, language production in a communicative task as compared to a non-communicative
task was found to recruit parts of the mentalizing network: the temporoparietal junction /
superior temporal sulcus (TPJ/pSTS), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; [1,2]).
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Similarly, in a non-linguistic context, the pSTS is more activated when planning a communica-
tive action compared to a non-communicative action [3] and during communicative pointing
compared to non-communicative pointing [4].
But what sets apart communicative from non-communicative language production? In a
communicative context, speakers typically have to take into account what information they share
with their addressee (common ground) and what information they do not share (privileged
ground). For example, when explaining the results of your latest experiment to a colleague, you
should take into account how much this person knows about your research topic and whether
you have talked about it before. Such adjustments require that you monitor common ground to
create a model of what knowledge and beliefs you have in common with your interlocutor [5–7].
Some information for the model may be available from the start of the interaction, while other
information only becomes available as the interaction unfolds [8]. For example, while explaining
the results of your experiment to your colleague, you may discover that they know less about the
topic than you anticipated, requiring you to adjust your language use accordingly. Here we
extend previous studies on the neural basis of communicative language production by explicitly
manipulating common and privileged ground in a language production task.
We examined the neural mechanisms that allow speakers to adapt their language use to
moment-to-moment changes in common ground by manipulating which information they do
or do not share with their addressee, in addition to comparing language production in a com-
municative and a non-communicative context. We used a well-established paradigm that
allows for tight control over the linguistic utterances that are produced. Speakers in the MRI
scanner either described objects to a listener outside the scanner (communicative blocks) or for
themselves (non-communicative blocks), which allowed us to tap into the process of building a
model of your addressee. In addition, and most importantly, within the communicative blocks,
we manipulated whether the speaker had to distinguish between common and privileged
ground in order to communicate efficiently with the listener (privileged ground vs. control con-
ditions). In the privileged ground condition, speakers saw additional competitor objects that
were occluded from the addressee’s point of view. They had to take into account that the
addressee could not see these privileged-ground objects in order to communicate clearly with
the addressee. In the control conditions, all relevant objects were mutually visible.
Previous psycholinguistic research has shown that speakers are generally able to distinguish
between common and privileged ground information in their utterances, but that they cannot
completely ignore privileged ground information (e.g., [9–13]). For example, in a previous eye-
tracking study using the same paradigm as the communicative blocks in the current study [10], we
found that speakers generally take their addressee’s perspective into account in privileged ground
trials, but sometimes produce descriptions from their own perspective. We found no evidence that
taking your addressee’s perspective into account results in longer planning durations. In the cur-
rent study, we expected to replicate these behavioral results in the communicative blocks.
Our neural hypotheses are driven by recent meta-analyses that distinguish between sub-
functions in the mentalizing network [14,15]. One proposal is that the mPFC supports infer-
ences about other people’s or your own lasting psychological and social states, such as
personality traits, while the TPJ is involved in inferring temporary states of other people, such
as immediate goals and intentions [15,16]. In this view, building an overall model of your
interlocutor during a communicative task might rely especially on the mPFC, while faster,
moment-by-moment adaptations to changes in common ground could involve the TPJ/pSTS
[8]. In the present experiment, we therefore hypothesized that using a mental model of your
addressee might especially engage the mPFC, because the information in these models mostly
relates to enduring features of the addressee. The mPFC should therefore be sensitive to the
general difference between communicative and non-communicative context. On the other
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hand, we expected that the TPJ should be especially engaged when speakers detect a relevant
perspective difference during the communicative task blocks and need to adjust their language
use accordingly. That is, we expected the TPJ to be sensitive to the distinction between infor-
mation that is in common ground and information that is in privileged ground. Finally, given
that speakers need to monitor the distinction between common and privileged ground in the
communicative blocks, we expected that we might already find neural differences between the
communicative and the non-communicative blocks during the viewing phase of the trials.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited between May and December 2013. Twenty-four pairs of right-
handed native Dutch speakers participated in the study. Participants did not know each other
before the start of the experiment and signed up individually through the online university
study participation system. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
history of neurological disease. They gave written informed consent before the start of the
experiment. Data from two pairs were excluded due to technical problems and data from two
additional pairs were excluded due to excessive movement by the subject in the scanner (sud-
den movements of the head larger than 3.5mm in any direction). The results of the remaining
forty participants (speakers: 22.55 years old, range 19–28 years old; 1 man; listeners: six men;
22.35 years old, range 18–28 years) are reported below. No participants dropped out during
the study. Theory of mind localizer data from two participants were excluded from the analysis
due to excessive motion during this task. The study was approved by the local ethics commit-
tee, Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek regio Arnhem-Nijmegen (CMO2001/095).
Materials
The materials were created in the same way as in Vanlangendonck et al. [10]. In that study, we
distinguished between situations in which failing to take the addressee’s perspective into
account either did (obligatory conditions) or did not (advisable conditions) threaten commu-
nicative success. We merged the obligatory and advisable conditions from this previous study
in the current experiment. We manipulated the number, size and visibility of the relevant
objects to create 6 conditions (Fig 1). In the privileged ground conditions (left column Fig 1), a
competitor object was placed in a slot that was open only on the speaker’s side. In communica-
tive trials, speakers had to ignore this competitor object in order to unambiguously describe
the target object, because speakers knew that the listener could not see the competitor object.
In non-communicative blocks, speakers did not have to ignore the additional competitor
object, because there was no listener present (see the procedure section below). We created
two types of control conditions, in which there was no occluded competitor object. In the lin-
guistic control conditions (middle column Fig 1), the occluded object was replaced by another,
unrelated object. As a result, speakers saw one relevant object fewer in these conditions than in
the privileged ground conditions. This condition is called the linguistic control condition,
since speakers were expected to produce the same verbal response in this condition as in com-
municative privileged ground trials in which they successfully adjusted their response based
on their addressee’s perspective. In the visual control conditions (right column Fig 1), the
object that was occluded in the privileged ground condition was visible to both participants. In
these conditions, speakers therefore saw the same number of relevant objects as in the privi-
leged ground conditions, hence we call these the “visual control” conditions.
Twelve different empty virtual arrays were used in the experiment. Each array was filled
with six to eight objects chosen from a total of 22 objects. Objects were selected from the
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Object Databank, stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the Neural Basis of
Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.
org/. Each object could appear in four different sizes to make sure that participants could not
rely on absolute size. Target/competitor objects and filler objects all appeared in sets of one,
two or three objects of the same type to make sure that participants could not predict which
objects would be relevant. The speaker and listener always saw the same total number of
objects in a trial because we added filler objects to the occluded slots if needed. We created a
unique stimulus list for each participant pair. Trials were presented in blocks of six trials that
were created using the same array. The order of the trials within each block was randomized,
and we randomized the blocks of trials so that neighboring blocks did not use the same array.
More information about the trial creation and randomization can be found in Vanlangen-
donck, et al. [10].
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the roles of speaker and listener with a coin toss. The
speaker performed the task in the MRI scanner, while the listener was seated in front of a com-
puter in the MRI control room. The speakers spoke through a noise-cancelling microphone
and listeners could hear the speaker over headphones. Participants completed four blocks of
the main task (2 communicative and 2 non-communicative blocks), followed by a Stroop task
localizer and a theory of mind localizer. The order of the four task blocks and the order of the
localizers were counterbalanced. Each task block of the main experiment consisted of 60 trials,
resulting in 240 trials in total. Before each block, speakers were informed whether the follow-
ing block would be communicative or non-communicative.
Fig 1. Overview of a triplet of trials from the speaker’s point of view, and the expected speaker responses in each of the six conditions. The task of the speaker was
to describe a target object (red circle) for the listener (communicative blocks) or for him/herself (non-communicative blocks). In the communicative privileged ground
condition, we expected speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account (“small glass”). If they failed to take their addressee’s perspective into account, they
could also describe the target object from their own perspective (“medium glass”). There was no relevant perspective difference in the other conditions. In the linguistic
control conditions, speakers were expected to give the same verbal response as in the communicative priviliged ground condition. In the visual control conditions, both
participants could see the competitor object that was occluded in the communicative privileged ground condition. Speakers thus saw the same number of relevant
objects as in the privileged ground conditions. The green squares were added to the figure for clarification purposes to indicate the objects that differ between the
privileged ground and the control conditions. They were not visible to the participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g001
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In communicative blocks, speakers and listeners played a referential communication game,
in which the speaker described objects for the listener to select. Each trial featured a 4 x 4 array
containing objects of different sizes. Each array contained three closed slots on each player’s
side, allowing us to manipulate which objects were in common ground. Objects that were visi-
ble to both players were in (visual) common ground, while objects that were only visible to one
player were in that player’s privileged ground (Fig 2). Each trial consisted of a viewing phase
and a speaking phase. During the viewing phase, each player was shown his or her side of the
array for 3000 ms. During the speaking phase (4000 ms), the speaker named the target object
for the addressee (Fig 2). The target object was indicated using a red circle and was always in
common ground. On the basis of the speaker’s description, the listener clicked on the intended
object in his or her display. A variable jitter of 3000–5000 ms preceded each phase of the trial.
The listener did not participate in the non-communicative blocks of the task. In these
blocks, the speaker saw the same type of arrays as in the communicative blocks, but they were
Fig 2. Trial sequence of a communicative trial from the speaker and the listener’s point of view. In the first phase of each trial, the speaker and the listener each
viewed their side of the array. In the second phase of the trial, a red circle indicated which object the speaker had to describe. The speaker planned their response,
pressed a button once they were ready to start speaking and then described the target object for the listener. At the same time, the listener tried to click on the intended
object. The trial sequence in the non-communicative blocks looked identical, except that the listener did not take part in this task.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g002
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told that the listener would not participate in these blocks. The speaker was therefore
instructed to describe the cued objects for themselves. Based on this instruction, we expected
speakers to produce responses that did not take the distinction between common and privi-
leged information into account in these blocks (Fig 1).
Speakers were instructed not to use spatial descriptions, such as ‘leftmost’ or ‘third row’.
Their verbal responses were recorded using a noise-cancelling microphone and they pressed a
button when they were ready to start speaking, giving us a measure of the time they needed to
plan their utterances. We recorded the location of the listeners’ mouse clicks, which allowed us
to calculate the listeners’ accuracy. Before the start of the experiment, the speaker and the lis-
tener practiced the communicative task together using a real array and real objects. They then
practiced the task together on a computer, and the speaker practiced the descriptive task by
him/herself. The speaker also named all object pictures once before the start of the experiment
to make sure they could easily recognize and name the objects.
After the experimental task, speakers completed a theory of mind localizer task [17–19].
We included this task to localize the mentalizing network. The false belief theory of mind loca-
lizer task shares an important feature with the communicative task, namely the requirement to
represent different perspectives or beliefs. In both the communicative task and the localizer
task, participants need to take into account what information is available to someone else and
use this information to respond appropriately. During the localizer task, speakers were pre-
sented with twenty stories that required participants to represent false content. In half of the
stories the false content concerned the physical state of an object (false photograph); in the
other half of the stories it concerned another person’s belief (false belief). Each story was pre-
sented for ten seconds, after which participants were given a statement about the story to
judge. They had to respond to the statements with a button press within five seconds. A vari-
able inter-trial interval of 4000–8000 ms preceded each trial.
Participants also completed a Stroop localizer task based on Milham et al. [20]. A number
of previous studies have shown that cognitive control plays a role in referential communica-
tion tasks (e.g., [21–24]), so we intended to use the main contrast of interest (incongruent >
neutral) as a localizer for cognitive control processes. However, the incongruent > neutral
contrast did not result in any significant clusters in our study and could therefore not be used
for the planned analyses.
Data acquisition and analysis
Participants were scanned in a Siemens 3T Skyra scanner using a 32-channel head coil. The func-
tional images were acquired using an EPI multi-echo sequence (TR = 2250 ms; TE1 at 9 ms, TE2
at 19.3 ms, TE3 at 30 ms, TE4 at 40 ms; 36 slices; ascending slice order; slice thickness = 3 mm;
slice gap = 0.3 mm; 64 x 64 matrix size; field of view = 212 x 212 mm; flip angle = 90˚; voxel size =
3.3 x 3.3 x 3 mm). A high-resolution T1 image was acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (TR =
2300 ms; TE = 3.03 ms; 192 slices; voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm, field of view = 256 × 256 × 192 mm).
Each of the four task blocks and the localizer tasks were scanned in separate runs. We
acquired 30 additional functional scans before each block. These scans were used to calculate
the optimal weighting of the five echoes, and this weighting matrix was applied to the remain-
ing functional scans [25]. The functional images were processed using SPM8 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.uk/spm). The preprocessing of the functional images
consisted of realignment to correct for head motion, slice timing correction to the onset of the
middle slice, coregistration of the functional images to the T1 based on the subject-mean func-
tional image, normalization to MNI space and spatial smoothing using a 3-dimensional isotro-
pic Gaussian smoothing kernel (full-width half-maximum = 8 mm).
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In the first-level statistical model, we included six event-types modeling the viewing phases
(1 per condition), six event-types modeling the planning phases (1 per condition) and two
event-types modeling the speaking phases (communicative and non-communicative). Events
were modeled from picture onset until the button press for planning, and from the button
press until picture offset for speaking. If the speaker had forgotten to press the button, we used
a fixed planning duration of 900 ms. We also included six motion regressors per run. We ran
an extra analysis with an additional regressor for the unexpected responses across conditions,
but the results of this analysis were similar to the results of the reported analysis. A separate
statistical model was created to analyze the theory of mind localizer. This model included four
event-types (false belief stories, false photograph stories, false belief statements and false photo-
graph statements) and six motion regressors. We used boxcar functions to model the durations
(10 s for stories; 5 s for statements). All event-types from the main experiment and the localizer
were convolved with the hemodynamic response function. Individual t-contrasts were created
and used in second-level random-effect analyses. Group analyses were performed using one-
sample t-tests. Whole-brain results were corrected for multiple comparisons by combining a
p< 0.001 voxel-level threshold with a cluster extent threshold of 41 voxels. These settings were
obtained by performing 2500 randomizations to assess which cluster extend level leads to false
positive correction at a family-wise error rate of 5%. The combination of a voxel-level thresh-
old with a cluster extent threshold is a good compromise between statistical sensitivity on the
one hand and false positive error control on the other hand [26,27]. The script was retrieved
from https://www2.bc.edu/sd-slotnick/scripts.htm.
For illustrative purposes, we computed parameter estimates for regions of interest (ROIs)
in the mPFC, and left and right TPJ using Marsbar [28]. The ROIs were based on the mPFC
and TPJ clusters found in the communicative privileged ground > communicative linguistic con-
trol and the communicative privileged ground > communicative visual control contrasts. We
selected only voxels that were significantly activated in both contrasts. The temporoparietal
clusters were part of a large, interconnected cluster, so we further limited these ROIs to voxels
with x coordinates under -35 (left) or over 35 (right).
We coded the sound files for adjective use and we used speakers’ button press responses to
determine the planning duration for each trial. We removed trials without a button press, trials
without a response that could be coded and planning durations that were more than 3 stan-
dard deviations removed from the mean per subject from the dataset for the behavioral analy-
sis (total 3.9% of trials removed). Listener performance was calculated by determining whether
listeners clicked on the right slot within the 4000 ms response interval. We then analyzed
speakers’ modifier use using logit mixed models and their planning durations using 2 x 3
repeated measures ANOVAs to investigate the effects of block (communicative or non-com-
municative), condition (privileged ground, linguistic control or visual control), and the inter-
actions between these two factors. In addition, we tested whether we could replicate the results
of our previous eye-tracking study [10] by comparing the communicative privileged ground
condition to each of the communicative control conditions. All behavioral analyses were run
in R version 3.0.3.
Results
Behavioral results
Manipulation checks. To check whether our block manipulation worked, we checked
whether speakers indeed changed their strategy between the communicative and the non-
communicative blocks. In the communicative blocks, we expected them to take their address-
ee’s perspective into account in the privileged ground trials (e.g., by saying “small glass” instead
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of “medium glass”). Indeed, we found that speakers produced mostly responses that took their
addressee’s perspective into account in the communicative privileged ground condition
(70.17%). Given that there was no addressee present in the non-communicative blocks, speak-
ers did not have to adapt their responses to what someone else could see in the non-communi-
cative privileged ground conditions. In line with this prediction, we found that speakers
produced descriptions from their own perspective in 75.22% of trials in the non-communica-
tive privileged ground condition. A paired t-test revealed that speakers produced significantly
more responses that took their addressee’s perspective into account in the communicative
privileged ground condition, t(19) = 4.63, p< 0.001. We hence conclude that the communica-
tive manipulation was successful.
In the communicative blocks, listeners tried to select the object described by the speaker.
Overall listener performance was high (83.47% correct), indicating that speakers and listeners
understood the task.
Modifier use. Fig 3A shows the mean percentage of “expected responses”, i.e. responses
that match the predictions in Fig 1. In the communicative privileged ground condition, we
expected speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account, while we did not expect
speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account in the non-communicative privi-
leged ground condition. We analyzed the use of expected responses using logit mixed models
[29]. We created a full model with random intercepts for subjects, and fixed effects of condi-
tion (privileged ground, linguistic control or visual control), block type (communicative or
Fig 3. Percentage of expected responses and mean planning durations per condition. The expected responses were coded based on the predictions in Fig 1. Planning
durations were calculated from picture onset until speakers pressed the button to indicate that they were ready to respond. Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g003
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non-communicative) and the condition x block interaction. We tested the interaction and main
effects through model comparison with reduced models omitting these effects. We found a sig-
nificant main effects of condition (χ2(2) = 557.44, p< 0.001), but no significant main effect of
block (χ2(2) = 0.60, p = 0.43) and no significant block x condition interaction effect (χ2(2) =
2.25, p = 0.33). Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed significantly more expected responses in the lin-
guistic control conditions compared to the privileged ground conditions (t(19) = -2.97, p<
0.05) and in the visual control conditions compared to the linguistic control conditions (t(19) =
-2.52, p< 0.05) after Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Speakers produced more expected responses in the communicative linguistic control con-
dition compared to the communicative privileged ground condition, t(19) = 3.07, p< 0.01,
and in the communicative visual control condition compared to the communicative privileged
ground condition, t(19) = 3.68, p< 0.01. These findings are in line with previous studies with
similar designs that showed that speakers generally take their addressee’s perspective into
account in communicative tasks, although they cannot completely ignore privileged ground
information [9–13]. The results of the linguistic control condition are below ceiling, because
speakers sometimes produced overinformative responses by including a modifier when it was
not necessary (see also the results of the advisable linguistic control condition in [10]).
Planning duration. An overview of the mean planning durations per condition can be
found in Fig 3B. A 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with type of block (communicative or
non-communicative) and condition (privileged ground, linguistic control or visual control) as
factors did not reveal significant main or interaction effects (block: F(1,19) = 1.84, p = 0.19;
condition: F(2,38) = 1.65, p = 0.21; block x condition: F(2,38) = 2.18, p = 0.13).
In order to compare these results with our previous eye-tracking study, we compared plan-
ning durations in the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the communica-
tive control conditions using paired t-tests. We found that speakers took longer to plan their
utterance in the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the linguistic con-
trol condition, t(19) = 2.53, p< 0.05. We did not find a significant difference in planning dura-
tion between the communicative privileged ground condition and the communicative visual
control condition, t(19) = 0.82, p = 0.42.
fMRI results
The goal of the present study was to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying speakers’
ability to take into account common ground during language production. First, we compared
language planning and viewing in a communicative and a non-communicative context. We
hypothesized that speakers would use a mental model of their addressee when planning an
utterance in the communicative as compared to the non-communicative blocks. In addition,
given that keeping track of the distinction between objects in common and in privileged
ground only matters in the communicative blocks, we expected that speakers might use differ-
ent strategies to explore the visual arrays before knowing which object to describe depending
on whether they were in a communicative or a non-communicative context. Second, and most
importantly, we compared language production in situations in which the speaker has to take
into account common ground in order to communicate efficiently with their addressee and
situations in which this is not necessary. This we explored in the comparison between commu-
nicative versus non-communicative privileged ground planning, as well as by comparing the
communicative privileged ground planning condition to the two control conditions (linguis-
tic, visual) in the communicative blocks. For the “viewing” analysis, we focused on the viewing
phase of the trials (see Fig 2). For all other analyses, we focused on the planning phase, i.e. the
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time between the moment the speaker saw the array with a red circle around the target object
and the moment they pressed the button to indicate that they were ready to start speaking.
Communicative vs. non-communicative privileged ground planning. We first com-
pared the communicative and the non-communicative privileged ground trials because speak-
ers only had to take their addressee’s perspective into account in the communicative privileged
ground trials. The effect of communicative context may therefore be strongest when compar-
ing these conditions directly. The contrast between planning in the communicative and non-
communicative privileged ground conditions resulted in a series of clusters described in
Table 1 and visualized in Fig 4. We found two right superior frontal clusters, one of which
extends into the medial frontal gyrus, a left superior medial frontal cluster that extends into
the left superior frontal gyrus, a cluster in the left insula and inferior frontal gyrus and a right
inferior frontal cluster that extends into the right insula.
Communicative privileged ground vs. linguistic and visual control planning. We com-
pared planning in the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the control con-
ditions. The results of these contrasts overlap considerably, as can be seen in Fig 5. The
contrast between the communicative privileged ground condition and the communicative lin-
guistic control condition resulted in a large cluster covering parts of the inferior and superior
parietal lobule as well as the superior occipital gyrus. In the frontal lobe, we found a superior
medial frontal cluster, a right orbitofrontal cluster and left and right middle frontal clusters.
Finally, we found bilateral insula and fusiform activations. Similarly, the contrast between the
communicative privileged ground condition and the communicative visual control condition
resulted in a large bilateral cluster covering the superior parietal lobule and angular gyri. In
addition, we found a number of left and right inferior frontal, middle frontal and superior
frontal activations. We also found clusters in the right fusiform gyrus and the right middle
temporal gyrus, as well as in the left insula and the left cerebellum.
Communicative vs. non-communicative planning. We compared speech planning in
the communicative and the non-communicative blocks, collapsed over conditions. This
resulted in one cluster in the right superior frontal gyrus (Fig 4, Table 1).
Communicative vs. non-communicative viewing. Given that common ground is
thought to be updated continuously during conversation [5], we expected that we may find
neural differences even before speakers started to plan their utterances when comparing com-
municative and non-communicative task blocks. This comparison revealed clusters in the left
and right middle occipital and calcarine gyri, as well as the right postcentral gyrus, the left cin-
gulate cortex and the right inferior temporal gyrus (Fig 6, Table 1).
Theory of mind localizer: False belief vs. false photograph. We compared the false belief
and false photograph statements conditions from the theory of mind localizer. In this contrast,
we found a large set of brain regions commonly found in theory of mind tasks including the
bilateral TPJ, the precuneus and the mPFC (Table 2, Fig 7).
Discussion
In this study, we examined the neural mechanisms that allow speakers to adapt their language
use to moment-to-moment changes in common ground by manipulating which information
they do or do not share with their addressee, in addition to comparing language production in
a communicative and a non-communicative context. Behaviorally, we aimed to replicate the
results of our previous study [10]. Neurally, we aimed to test under what conditions the menta-
lizing network contributes to communicative language production. We therefore mostly focus
our discussion on brain regions that are part of this network.
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Table 1. Whole-brain results for task contrasts of interest.
Brain region Cluster extent (voxels) T value MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative privileged ground planning > non-communicative privileged ground planning
right superior frontal gyrus 219 6.37 16 22 60
right superior frontal gyrus 5.19 18 30 54
right superior medial frontal gyrus 4.51 8 24 60
left superior medial frontal gyrus 199 5.04 -8 46 24
left superior frontal gyrus 4.66 -12 26 40
right anterior cingulate cortex 4.50 6 44 24
left insula 139 4.83 -34 20 -8
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.72 -38 22 -16
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.17 -40 32 -10
right superior frontal gyrus 41 4.40 22 66 6
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 45 4.33 40 24 -10
right insula 4.24 32 20 -6
Communicative privileged ground planning > communicative linguistic control planning
left inferior parietal lobule 6339 7.53 -48 -50 48
right superior occipital gyrus 7.50 36 -78 44
right superior parietal lobule 6.66 38 -58 60
left superior medial frontal gyrus 656 6.35 -8 30 42
right superior medial frontal gyrus 4.84 8 28 42
left supplementary motor area 4.38 -6 22 50
right middle frontal gyrus 619 5.92 48 30 34
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) 5.10 50 20 38
right middle frontal gyrus 5.02 44 38 32
left middle frontal gyrus 394 4.93 -34 6 52
left middle frontal gyrus 4.71 -46 28 34
left middle frontal gyrus 4.67 -36 12 34
right insula 62 4.73 34 24 -6
right middle orbital gyrus 56 4.61 38 48 -8
right middle orbital gyrus 4.01 46 50 -8
right fusiform gyrus 162 4.55 38 -74 -18
right fusiform gyrus 3.95 42 -56 -16
right lingual gyrus 3.87 32 -82 -18
left insula 97 4.48 -30 22 0
left middle frontal gyrus 94 4.47 -44 50 8
left middle frontal gyrus 3.68 -38 46 4
left fusiform gyrus 82 4.36 -38 -72 -18
Communicative privileged ground planning > communicative visual control planning
right angular gyrus 7803 7.15 54 -58 36
right superior parietal lobule 6.45 14 -64 58
right angular gyrus 6.43 36 -66 48
right middle frontal gyrus 3493 6.93 48 26 36
left superior middle gyrus 6.50 -4 32 38
right middle frontal gyrus 6.35 44 20 42
left middle frontal gyrus 1014 6.33 -38 12 36
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 5.03 -60 20 22
left middle frontal gyrus 5.01 -42 26 40
right superior frontal gyrus 653 6.12 34 62 14
(Continued)
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Behavioral results
Speakers generally took their addressee’s perspective into account when designing referring
expressions in the communicative blocks, although they failed to ignore privileged information
on all trials. These results are in line with previous findings using similar paradigms [9–13]
and mostly results replicate the findings of our previous eye-tracking study [10]. Speakers pro-
duced slightly fewer expected responses in the communicative conditions in the current study
compared to the previous study. One likely cause for this difference is that speakers switched
between communicative and non-communicative blocks in the current experiment. Previous
studies have shown that switching perspectives is costly once people have adopted a specific
spatial perspective, even when switching to one’s own perspective [30,31]. Another difference
is that in the current study, speakers’ planning durations were shorter in the communicative
Table 1. (Continued)
Brain region Cluster extent (voxels) T value MNI coordinates
x y z
right superior frontal gyrus 5.78 26 64 12
right middle frontal gyrus 4.93 36 64 2
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 287 5.76 32 24 -8
right insula 4.68 32 28 2
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.48 42 24 -16
right fusiform gyrus 133 4.68 40 -62 -20
right fusiform gyrus 4.05 34 -68 -16
right fusiform gyrus 3.73 26 -64 -12
right middle temporal gyrus 64 4.65 50 -42 -10
right middle temporal gyrus 4.30 58 -38 -10
right inferior temporal gyrus 3.88 58 -48 -10
left cerebellum 93 4.57 -36 -68 -22
left cerebellum 4.22 -30 -74 -22
left insula 65 4.33 -26 24 -4
Communicative all conditions planning > non-communicative all conditions planning
right superior frontal gyrus 106 4.74 18 20 60
right superior frontal gyrus 4.30 20 6 64
right superior frontal gyrus 4.27 18 28 58
Communicative all conditions viewing > non-communicative all conditions viewing
left middle occipital gyrus 241 5.75 -42 -80 6
left middle occipital gyrus 4.67 -36 -86 12
left superior occipital gyrus 4.29 -20 -96 18
right postcentral gyrus 362 5.60 42 -28 42
right inferior parietal lobule 4.35 44 -42 54
right precentral gyrus 4.30 38 -20 44
left calcarine gyrus 224 5.16 -14 -64 14
left calcarine gyrus 5.10 -12 -58 8
left middle cingulate cortex 61 5.03 -8 -34 50
right calcarine gyrus 205 4.89 6 -64 10
right calcarine gyrus 3.76 10 -56 12
right inferior temporal gyrus 66 4.51 48 -60 -6
right inferior occipital gyrus 4.00 40 -68 -6
right middle occipital gyrus 65 4.22 40 -78 22
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.t001
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linguistic control condition than in the communicative privileged ground condition. Compar-
ing the planning durations across conditions (Fig 3B) suggests that speakers were especially
fast in this condition compared to the other conditions.
fMRI results: Communicative privileged ground vs. non-communicative
privileged ground planning
Speakers were only expected to adjust their language use based on their addressee’s perspective
during speech planning in the communicative privileged ground condition. We therefore
Fig 4. Brain areas showing greater activity in the communicative planning conditions compared to the non-
communicative planning conditions (red) and the brain regions showing greater activity during the planning
phase of the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the non-communicative privileged ground
condition (yellow). In the latter comparison, the effect of communicative context was expected to be maximal.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g004
Taking common ground into account
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943 October 11, 2018 13 / 21
expected that the effect of communicative context on speech planning would be strongest in
the direct comparison between speech planning in the communicative and the non-communi-
cative privileged ground conditions. This contrast revealed clusters of activation in the right
superior frontal gyrus, the left insula and inferior frontal gyrus, and in the dorsal mPFC.
The mPFC is a core region of the mentalizing network that supports the integration of
social information over time [15]. It is thought to be subdivided into a more dorsal section,
which is activated when thinking about the mental states of dissimilar others, and a ventral
Fig 5. Brain areas showing greater activity during planning in the communicative privileged ground condition compared
to the communicative linguistic control condition (blue) and the communicative visual control condition (green). The
graphs below depict the parameter estimates in the different conditions in the mPFC, and the left and right TPJ. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. Note that we did not test for statistically significant differences between the parameter
estimates of different conditions in order to avoid making the non-independence error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g005
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part, which is activated especially when thinking about the mental states of similar others
[15,32]. Given that speakers and listeners did not know each other before the start of the exper-
iment and that successful performance in the communicative privileged ground condition
required speakers to focus on differences in perspective, it is unsurprising that the dorsal part
of the mPFC was activated in this comparison. Our whole-brain results suggest that the mPFC
is selectively engaged by the communicative privileged ground condition. The parameter esti-
mates plotted in Fig 5 illustrate this. The mPFC thus appears to be especially activated when
speakers perform a communicative task that requires them to adapt their language use to their
Fig 6. Brain areas showing greater activity in the communicative viewing conditions compared to the non-communicative viewing conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g006
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addressee’s needs in order to communicate efficiently. These findings mimic the results of a
comprehension study that found that adult listeners only show increased activation in the dor-
sal mPFC when they have to take a speaker’s perspective into account to respond appropriately
[33].
fMRI results: Communicative privileged ground vs. linguistic and visual
control planning
When comparing the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the control con-
ditions, we found a large, overlapping network of activations that include the core regions of
the mentalizing network [14,15]: the mPFC and bilateral TPJ.
We found activations bilaterally in the dorsal/posterior part of the TPJ in this contrast. The
TPJ has been proposed to be important for inferring temporary states of other people, such as
goals, intentions, and desires, even when they differ from your own [15]. The posterior/dorsal
Table 2. Whole-brain results for comparison between false belief and false photograph statements.
Brain region Cluster extent (voxels) T value MNI coordinates
x y z
False belief > false photograph statements
left angular gyrus 1995 10 -56 -66 24
left middle temporal gyrus 7.77 -46 -56 22
left supramarginal gyrus 6.16 -60 -52 36
left precuneus 4297 9.7 2 -64 38
left precuneus 8.24 0 -56 40
left precuneus 7.53 -12 -50 40
right superior frontal gyrus 4999 8.69 16 46 34
right superior medial frontal gyrus 7.51 10 50 30
left superior frontal gyrus 7.2 -18 24 46
right angular gyrus 2143 8.38 48 -48 28
right angular gyrus 8.32 52 -62 26
right middle temporal gyrus 7.65 56 -60 18
left temporal pole 1453 7.23 -54 10 -32
left middle temporal gyrus 7.06 -62 -22 -12
left middle temporal gyrus 6.42 -54 -4 -20
right middle temporal gyrus 1565 6.95 54 4 -32
right temporal pole 6.59 50 20 -30
right middle temporal gyrus 6.56 58 -30 -2
right cerebellum 224 6.75 24 -80 -26
right cerebellum 4.5 44 -74 -24
left middle orbital gyrus 162 5.93 0 60 -12
left superior orbital gyrus 4.17 -14 58 -10
left middle orbital gyrus 3.81 -22 54 -10
left caudate nucleus 76 5.71 -14 8 20
left caudate nucleus 4.88 -12 -2 20
left cerebellum 395 5.67 -28 -76 -30
left cerebellum 5.67 -18 -88 -26
left cerebellum 4.87 -46 -72 -26
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 46 4.81 -42 24 -8
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.21 -48 28 -4
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.t002
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part of this area may be especially important for the processing of mental perspectives [14].
Speakers’ visual perspective for relevant objects only differed from their addressee’s in the
communicative privileged ground condition. The cluster we find in this area may therefore be
the result of representing this perspective difference.
In addition to regions involved in mentalizing, we found bilateral clusters of activation in
the ventro- and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are known to play an important role in
cognitive control processes (e.g., [34,35]). In the communicative privileged ground condition,
speakers had to ignore an occluded competitor object. In contrast, all relevant objects were vis-
ible to both participants in the control conditions. Previous studies [21,23,24] have shown that
inhibitory control skills correlate with people’s ability to take another person’s perspective into
account during social interaction, suggesting that adapting your language use to another per-
son’s perspective depends on your ability to inhibit your own perspective.
fMRI results: Communicative vs. non-communicative planning
When comparing brain activity during speech planning in the communicative and non-com-
municative blocks, we found activation in a right superior frontal cluster. Although not con-
sidered one of the core components of the mentalizing network, it is interesting to note that
this cluster appears in all contrasts we tested, as well in the theory of mind localizer. Similar
right superior frontal activations have been found before in theory of mind tasks, including
false belief tasks and tasks in which participants made trait judgments [14].
Fig 7. Brain areas showing greater activity during planning in the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the communicative linguistic control
condition (A, blue), in the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the communicative visual control condition (B, blue) and in the false belief
condition compared to the false photograph condition in the theory of mind localizer (A & B, cyan).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202943.g007
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fMRI results: Communicative vs. non-communicative viewing
The contrast between communicative and non-communicative viewing revealed a set of occip-
ital and parietal clusters. One likely explanation for these findings is that speakers used a differ-
ent strategy in the communicative and non-communicative viewing phases. The viewing
phase allowed speakers to visually explore the objects in the array before seeing the cue indicat-
ing which object they had to describe. However, the distinction between objects in common
and in privileged ground only mattered in the communicative blocks. Speakers may have
therefore paid additional attention to the location of objects (in open or occluded slots) in the
communicative blocks, resulting in increased activity in areas associated with visual attention
[36]. Similar anticipation effects have been found in language comprehension [37].
fMRI results: Theory of mind localizer
It is interesting to note that the clusters of activation we found in the comparisons between the
conditions in the main task only partially overlap with the results of the theory of mind locali-
zer. The temporoparietal clusters we found in the main task extend more dorsally compared to
the cluster we found in the theory of mind localizer task, and we find little overlap between
clusters in the mPFC. One possible explanation for these differences is that the theory of mind
localizer we used here is not the most suitable task to tap into the perspective-taking processes
speakers engaged in during the main task. Adapting your language use based on what your
addressee can see requires relatively low-level visual perspective-taking (so-called level 1 per-
spective-taking). While both visual perspective-taking and false belief tasks require the repre-
sentation of different perspectives, the neural correlates of these tasks do not completely
overlap [38]. Alternatively, the limited overlap between the task contrasts and the localizer
results may be due to statistical thresholding. In line with this possibility, we found increased
overlap when we used a less stringent statistical threshold, especially in the TPJ.
General discussion
In line with previous studies, our results show that adjusting your linguistic message for an
addressee engages the mentalizing or theory of mind network. However, this study is the first
to tease apart the effects of communicative context and the need to adjust your linguistic utter-
ance to take common ground into account. Our results suggest that the mentalizing network
plays a crucial role when speakers have to consider which information they share with their
addressee in order to be informative. We extend previous findings by showing that the mPFC
does not appear to be sensitive to communicative context per se, but rather becomes more acti-
vated when the communicative context has consequences for linguistic processing (i.e. when
speakers have to take common ground into account to communicate efficiently). The TPJ, on
the other hand, may be important for processing and representing your interlocutor’s perspec-
tive when it differs from your own. It may therefore be especially sensitive to potentially rele-
vant perspective differences.
What do these findings mean for accounts of the neurobiology of language? One important
finding is that the mentalizing network appears to be especially involved during communica-
tive language processing when speakers have to take common ground into account. Our find-
ings thus do not suggest that the mentalizing network always comes online when speakers
design utterances for an addressee. Rather, areas involved in social cognition appear to be
selectively activated when speakers need to take common ground into account in order to
communicate efficiently. However, our results from the viewing phase show that being in a
communicative as compared to a non-communicative context can lead to neural differences
before language planning has started (i.e., before speakers knew which object they had to
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describe). While we did not collect eye-tracking data, a likely explanation is that speakers were
more sensitive to the distinction between common and privileged information in the commu-
nicative viewing phases as compared to the non-communicative viewing phases. A recent
MEG study [39] also reported neural differences between communicative and non-communi-
cative settings before participants were presented with a communication problem. Combined,
our results suggest that speakers monitored which objects were visible to their addressee dur-
ing the viewing phase in the communicative blocks and then used this information to deter-
mine whether they had to adjust their linguistic utterance to take their addressee into account.
This suggests that speakers in a communicative setting continuously update common ground
and use this information to adapt their linguistic utterances based on their addressee’s needs.
In the current experiment, speakers could relatively easily take common ground into account
by considering which objects were visible to the other person. However, in real-life communi-
cative settings, adapting your language use based on your addressee’s communicative needs
can be more complex. For example, in order to communicative efficiently, speakers may also
need to consider what their interlocutor knows and feels. In addition, it is important to note
that during real-life conversations, the distinction between communicative situations in which
speakers have to take common ground into account and situations in which this is not neces-
sary is much less clear-cut than in the current study. Future research will have to clarify how
the findings from the current study relate and generalize to communicative tasks that require
more high-level perspective taking (e.g., considering what your interlocutor knows about a
topic) and that incorporate more features of real-life social interactions (e.g., turn-taking).
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